





Initiative Process in Washington
Philip A. Talmadge*
I am honored to write this Introduction to the Seattle University
Law Review's Symposium on the initiative process in Washington. In
recent years, the people, exercising their basic constitutional right to
legislate, have proposed and enacted-or rejected-a smorgasbord of
initiative measures, ranging from public disclosure to denture regula-
tion. The Washington Supreme Court, however, has found some of
those initiative measures to violate the Washington Constitution and
has thus invalidated them.1
In this Symposium, the authors address a variety of issues associ-
ated with the initiative process in our state. They examine the specific
case of Initiative 695, the role of the courts in reviewing initiatives, the
application of the Republican Government Clause in the United States
Constitution to Washington's initiative process, and the larger ques-
tion of whether the entire initiative process is unconstitutional. These
articles are timely analyses of a pressing public issue.
* J.D., University of Washington; B.A., Yale University. The author was a member of
the Washington State Senate from 1979 to 1995 and a Justice of the Washington Supreme Court
from 1995 to 2001.
1. The Washington Supreme Court reviews initiative measures just as it would legislatively
enacted bills and finds such enactments unconstitutional where necessary. See, e.g., Limstrom
v. Ladenburg, 136 Wash. 2d 595, 606, 963 P.2d 869 (1998) (traditional rules of statutory con-
struction apply to initiatives); Culliton v. Chase, 174 Wash. 363, 373-74, 25 P.2d 81 (1933)
(initiatives subject to constitutional mandates). The Supreme Court has found term limits
unconstitutional, Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (1988), as well as tax
limitation measures like Initiative 695, Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142
Wash. 2d 183, 11 P.3d 762 (2000).
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Virtually no one interested in public affairs in this state lacks an
opinion on initiatives. I am no exception. From my perspective as a
former legislator and Supreme Court Justice, I have concerns about
the initiative process.
In 1912, the people adopted the initiative process; 2 it is a legiti-
mate form of expression for the people's will, particularly where the
traditional branches of government fail to act. I am concerned, how-
ever, that the initiative process has become a substitute for thoughtful
legislation, particularly on budget issues. I decry the lack of public
2. The Washington Constitution states with respect to initiatives:
The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature,
consisting of a senate and house of representatives, which shall be called the legisla-
ture of the state of Washington, but the people reserve to themselves the power to
propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the
legislature, and also reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the
polls any act, item, section, or party of any bill, act, or law passed by the legislature.
(a) Initiative: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. Every such
petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. In the case of the ini-
tiatives to the legislature and initiatives to the people, the number of valid signatures
of legal voters required shall be equal to eight percent of the votes cast for the office of
governor at the last gubernatorial election preceding the initial filing of the text of the
initiative measure with the secretary of state.
Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not less than four
months before the election at which they are to be voted upon, or not less than ten
days before any regular session of the legislature. If filed at least four months before
the election at which they are to be voted upon, he shall submit the same to the vote of
the people at the said election. If such petitions are filed not less than ten days before
any regular session of the legislature, he shall certify the results within forty days of
the filing. If certification is not complete by the date the legislature convenes, he shall
provisionally certify the measure pending final certification of the measure. Such ini-
tiative measures, whether certified or provisionally certified, shall take precedence
over all other measures in the legislature except appropriation bills and shall be either
enacted or rejected without change or amendment by the legislature before the end of
such regular session. If any such initiative measures shall be enacted by the legislature
it shall be subject to the referendum petition, or it may be enacted and referred by the
legislature to the people for approval or rejection at the next regular election. If it is
rejected or if no action is taken upon it by the legislature before the end of such regu-
lar session, the secretary of state shall submit it to the people for approval or rejection
at the next ensuing regular general election. The legislature may reject any measure
so proposed by initiative petition and propose a different one dealing with the same
subject, and in such event both measures shall be submitted by the secretary of state
to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular general election.
When conflicting measures are submitted to the people the ballots shall be so printed
that a voter can express separately by making one cross (X) for each, two preferences,
first, as between either measure and neither, and secondly, as between one and the
other. If the majority of those voting on the first issue is for neither, both fall, but in
that case the votes on the second issue shall nevertheless be carefully counted and
made public. If a majority voting on the first issue is for either, then the measure
receiving a majority of the votes on the second issue shall be law.
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1. See generally Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum in
Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L. REV. 55 (1973).
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process on most initiatives. Instead of open public hearings, debate,
and careful amendments to a bill, we have an undeliberative process
often characterized by secret and malevolent purposes.'
The development of a cottage industry on initiatives is troubling.
Today, we have consultants who go from state to state to enact
initiative measures for special interest groups with the money to sup-
port their effort. These consultants pay signature gatherers4 to assist
them in gathering signatures to advance a special interest agenda.
Instead of the initiative process being a mechanism for action where
the governor and legislature have failed to act, the initiative process
has become a separate governing process unto itself. Instead of being
a citizen's constitutional right to compel government action in the face
of a legislative failure to act because of special interests, the initiative
3. As one recent scholarly analysis of initiatives opines:
The proliferation of issue balloting... together with the objectives sought by many of
the proposals, places minority rights and individual liberties in serious jeopardy.
While the original advocates of American direct democracy may have emphasized
progressive governmental reforms, such applications are less common in modern
practice than are measures by which civil rights, and personal lifestyle and moral
choices, are threatened by an amorphous, anonymous majority. In the Sixties efforts
to repeal fair housing laws reached epidemic proportions. In the Seventies desegrega-
tive busing and antidiscrimination ordinances protecting homosexuals have fallen
prey to this "tyranny of the majority." Even facially neutral measures such as Califor-
nia's Proposition 13 may adversely affect the poor by curtailing government services
on which the poor, and hence minorities, are disproportionately dependent. In addi-
tion to discrimination against minorities, the list of personal liberties sought to be
regulated or constrained by initiative is both voluminous and alarming.
Compounding this threat is the lack of procedural safeguards governing initiative
and referendum use. Ballot certification can easily be obtained by a well-financed
interest group. "Tumultuous, media-oriented" campaigns often replace legislative
hearings and debate, reducing sensitive, complex political questions to simplistic
moral judgments and depriving a reviewing court of a coherent legislative history.
Once enacted, a ballot proposition may be more difficult to amend or repeal than a
legislative enactment, either because of statutory restraints or because of legislators'
pragmatic reluctance to defy the vox populi. While this lack of procedural safeguards
facilitates enactments hostile to minorities and individual liberties, the victim seeking
judicial redress is likely to encounter judicial deference, or paralysis, in dealing with
direction legislation.
Marc Slonim & James H. Lowe, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L.
REV. 175, 181-83 (1979) (Footnotes omitted). See also Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmak-
ing Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19
(1993). Justice Linde contends that certain initiatives fail of the Republican Government Clause
of the United States Constitution when they have a malevolent or stigmatizing intent aimed at
identified groups. He might be concerned with a measure like Initiative 200, aimed at eliminat-
ing affirmative action.
4. See, e.g., Waremart v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc. 139 Wash. 2d 623, 989 P.2d 524
(1999) (for-profit signature gathering organization sought access to private premises of grocery
store to gather signatures).
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process has instead become a tool of those special interests or people
with agendas not always fully revealed.'
The initiative process fails to secure public involvement in the
development of the proposed law. Once the measure is on the ballot,
it is all or nothing. Our constitution limits the ability of the legislature
to fix such measures, as they can only be amended by a two-thirds
vote of both houses for two years after their enactment.6 A small
group of willful people can develop and effectively enact an initiative
without any other consultation of the public, except perhaps the assis-
tance of the consultants mentioned above.
In contrast to the efforts of such modern, narrowly-focused
groups, the proponents of Initiative 276, the Public Disclosure Act,
actually toured the state of Washington and held public hearings and
broadly disseminated information on the proposed initiative, gathering
public input before they placed the measure on the ballot for consider-
ation. 7 The process utilized by the proponents of Initiative 276 had its
analog in the legislative hearing process, where all views on issues may
be expressed and problems in measures identified and addressed by
decision makers. In sad contrast to the initiatives proposed of late,
this kind of community deliberation and decision-making enriches our
system of government as an appropriate supplement to legislative
action.
Finally, I am concerned about the initiative process as an alterna-
tive to the traditional legislative process, particularly with respect to
budget matters. It is incredibly difficult for legislative bodies to devel-
op and enact budgets. It is nearly impossible to accomplish budgetary
decisions when so much of the budgetary process has been affected by
initiative measures.' The people in 1978 adopted Initiative 62, which
limited revenues and the growth of state government. In 1993, the
people enacted Initiative 601, which limited state government expend-
itures. When that measure proved too restrictive in its policy for
5. For example, what is the hidden agenda of Tim Eyman's Washington organization,
Permanent Offense, or Bill Sizemore in Oregon? We know of the agenda of George Soros-
liberalization of drug laws. See David Broder, "The Ballot Initiative Battle" (visited on Nov. 8,
2000) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4256-2000Nov2.html>. Seegener-
ally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER
OF MONEY (2000).
6. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1(c).
7. See Washington Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 574, 901 P.2d
1028 (1995) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
8. The people have acted frequently to revise Washington's tax structure, usually dimin-
ishing available revenues. The people passed an income tax by initiative (Initiative 69),
effectively eliminated the state inheritance tax (Initiative 402), and removed the sales tax on
trade-ins such as automobiles (Initiative 464), just to mention a few.
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transportation funding, the people voted in favor of Referendum 49 in
1999. In turn, that measure was substantially contradicted by Initia-
tive 695 in 1999. How can any rational policymaker function when
fiscal policy in the transportation arena lurches from one standard to
the next?
The culmination of this phenomenon of "budget by initiative"
was the 2000 election. The people enacted (simultaneously): Initia-
tive 722 (limiting property and other taxes); Initiative 728 (mandating
education spending increases); and Initiative 732 (providing cost of
living adjustments (COLAs) for teacher salaries). All have serious
and contradictory implications for the state general fund and transpor-
tation budgets.
Legislators serving on budget committees find that the proce-
dures for enacting a budget have been affected by initiatives: available
revenue has been affected, and the direction for expenditures has been
controlled as well. This is an irrational process for budgeting that no
sensible organization would tolerate. As the Seattle Times cogently
commented editorially:9
Like shoppers on a spending spree, voters on Election Day
bought themselves smaller classes in public schools, better
teacher pay and limits on property taxes. Now the Legislature
gets to figure out how to pay the bills.
If you thought last year's budgetary fallout from the car-tab
initiative turned a supposedly short legislative session into an
ungainly endurance contest, wait till you see the challenging
budget work that lies ahead next year in Olympia.
Three initiatives passed that together reflect $1 billion worth of
decisions voters made for lawmakers. The costliest measure is
Initiative 728, which spends roughly $500 million on class-size
reduction, extended learning time and school construction.
Though smaller, Initiative 732, the teacher-salary boost, creates
the biggest squeeze on competing programs paid for by the
general fund--over $400 million. Initiative 722, the property
tax cap, will cost the state an estimated $24 million, with much
larger impacts on local governments. Reconciling initiatives will
be a giant challenge.
The initiative process should be available for citizens when the
traditional branches of government fail to respond. The initiative
process should not be available as an end run around the deliberative
9. Editorial, Heavy Lifting: Reconciling Initiatives in Olympia, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 19,
2000, at D2.
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legislative process, or to short circuit policy-making in the regular leg-
islative arena.
While the initiative power is broad,1" it is not all-encompassing.
It does not extend, for example, to administrative actions." Perhaps
the initiative power does not,12 and should not, extend to budget-
related issues. Rational fiscal policy cannot be established when the
fiscal situation is buffeted by a constant barrage of initiative measures
adding or subtracting revenues and dictating expansion or contraction
of expenditures. If the initiative power actually extends to budget
matters, perhaps the legislature should have the courage to seek a con-
stitutional amendment from the people clarifying the appropriate
scope of the legislature's power to budget and the scope of the people's
power by popular measure to affect such fundamental policy-making.
For example, the Washington Attorney General could screen such
proposals for constitutionality and the voters could be apprised of the
state and local fiscal impact of such measures. A supermajority vote
10. Trautman, supra note 2, at 67. See State v. Davis, 133 Wash. 2d 187, 190-02, 943 P.2d
283 (1997) (rejecting challenges to initiatives based on the federal Republican Government
Clause); State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 669-72, 921 P.2d 473 (1996).
11. Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash. 2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973); Durocher v. King County,
80 Wash. 2d 139, 492 P.2d 547 (1972).
12. Arguably, Article 8, section 4 of the Washington Constitution entrusts the appropri-
ation power exclusively to the legislature:
No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this state, or any of its funds, or
any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by
law; nor unless such payment be made within one calendar month after the end of the
next ensuing fiscal biennium, and every such law making a new appropriation, or con-
tinuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated,
and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient for such law to
refer to any other law to fix such sum.
WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. As the Washington Supreme Court stated in State ex rel. Peel v.
Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1 (1917):
The object of Article 8, section 4, of the Washington constitution and the statute
cited, is to prevent expenditures of the public funds at the will of those who have them
in charge, and without legislative direction.
Its object is to secure to the legislative department of the government the exclu-
sive power of deciding how, when, and for what purposes the public funds shall
be applied in carrying on the government (2 Opinions Attorneys -General, 670).
It had its origin in Parliament in the seventeenth century, when the people of
Great Britain, to provide against the abuse by the king and his officers of the
discretionary money power with which they were vested, demanded that the
public funds should not be drawn from the treasury except in accordance with
express appropriations therefor made by Parliament.
Humbert v. Dunn, 84 Cal. 57, 59, 24 P. 111 (1890).
It is well understood that these provisions-and they are common to most, if not
all, of our written constitutions-are mandatory, and that no moneys can be paid
without the sanction of the legislative body. The legislative intent must be certain. It
is not to be disclosed by a construction of doubtful acts or ambiguous language. But it
does not follow that an appropriation need be in any particular form or words.
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would also be appropriate for measures that dramatically affect the
budgetary process such as votes on school levies, for example. 3
This Seattle University Law Review Symposium on initiatives
will highlight difficult issues facing the initiative process in
Washington and will offer substantive and sensible ways of
interpreting and dealing with initiatives in our state. All who value
our democratic system will look forward to the thoughts of the many
fine authors writing for this Symposium.
13. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2 (a sixty percent favorable vote required to pass various
levies such as school levies).
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